Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 44 (2000)

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556

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

18 at the time of the offense, the 1993 amendment repealed this corroboration requirement. The amended version of Article 38.07 thus permits sexual assault victims between 14 and 18 to have their testimony considered by the jury in the same manner and with the same effect as that of witnesses generally in Texas prosecutions.

This sort of corroboration requirement—still embodied in Article 38.07 for victims aged 18 or older—is a common, if increasingly outmoded, rule of evidence. Its purpose is to rein in the admissibility of testimony the legislature has deemed insufficiently credible standing alone. Texas' requirement of corroboration or outcry, like similar provisions in other jurisdictions, is premised on a legislative judgment that accusations made by sexual assault victims above a certain age are not independently trustworthy. See Villareal v. State, 511 S. W. 2d 500, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ("The basis of this rule is that the failure to make an outcry or promptly report the rape diminishes the credibility of the prosecutrix."); cf., e. g., Battle v. United States, 630 A. 2d 211, 217 (D. C. 1993) (evidence of outcry "rebuts an implied charge of recent fabrication, which springs from some jurors' assumptions that sexual offense victims are generally lying and that the victim's failure to report the crime promptly is inconsistent with the victim's current statement that the assault occurred").

Legislatures in many States, including Texas, have enacted similar evidentiary provisions requiring corroboration for the testimony of other categories of witnesses, particularly accomplices. See, e. g., Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.14 (Vernon Supp. 2000) ("A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed . . . ."). Such provisions—generally on the wane but still in force in several States—are, like Article 38.07, designed to ensure the credibility of the relevant witness. See, e. g., State v. Haugen, 448 N. W. 2d 191, 194

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