Cite as: 530 U. S. 156 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
found parole ineligible: the inevitability of the verdict is undermined equally with or without the judgment; and the defendant is eligible for parole under state law if the verdict is set aside, regardless of whether it is set aside before or after judgment is entered. In fact, though, the plurality really makes no attempt to explain the entry-of-judgment distinction in terms of either the at-the-time-of-sentencing-under-state-law rule, or in terms of the inevitable-under-state-law rule. Rather, the significance of the entry of judgment rests upon the assertion that a judgment is more certain than a jury verdict. The entry-of-judgment line, then, is really about relative degrees of certainty regarding parole ineligibility.17
If the question is not one in which state law controls (by looking to the defendant's conclusively determined status either at the time of sentencing or inevitably thereafter), the question of Simmons' applicability must be an issue of federal due process law. That is a proposition with which I agree entirely; indeed, Simmons itself makes that perfectly clear, as I discuss below. Before examining what Simmons'
17 Though the plurality insists that judgment "is the usual measure for finality," ante, at 176, its own opinion reveals that it does not mean "finality" in any absolute sense. Rather, it concedes that while a "jury verdict [is] uncertain," ante, at 175, "even a judgment" is "uncertain" too, because of "the availability of postjudgment relief," ante, at 176. What it means, then—though it is not particularly candid about it—is that a judgment is more certain than a verdict. Put differently, the plurality thinks a judgment is more enduring, in that there is a greater probability that a verdict will survive a motion to set it aside if there has already been an entry of judgment.
It is clear that the significance of the entry of judgment for the plurality must be based on that belief. The significance cannot be that without the entry of judgment the defendant is not ineligible for parole at the exact moment of sentencing; as explained above, that fact is not dispositive. See supra, at 185-187. Nor can its significance be that without the entry of judgment, his parole status is not inevitable. As also explained above, the entry of judgment has no significance insofar as inevitability is concerned. See supra, at 188-192 and this page.
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