194
Stevens, J., dissenting
due process requirements entail, however, it is important to understand the rationale behind Simmons: the need for capital sentencing juries to have accurate information about the defendant in the particular area of parole eligibility.
III
We stated in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976):
"If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the diffi-cult task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information about a defendant and the crime he committed in order to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing decision." Id., at 190 ( joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
This imperative is all the more critical when the jury must make a determination as to future dangerousness. "[A]ny sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what sentence to impose. . . . What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274-276 (1976) ( joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). When it comes to issues such as future dangerousness and the possibility of parole, it is therefore vitally important that "the jury [have] accurate information of which both the defendant and his counsel are aware," including "an accurate statement of a potential sentencing alternative." California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 1004, 1009 (1983).
This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution compels the States to tell the jury every single piece of information that may be relevant to its deliberations. See, e. g., id., at
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