Cite as: 530 U. S. 156 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
VI
Nothing in the above arguments should distract us from the fact that this is a simple case. The question turns on whether the hypothetical possibility that the trial judge might fail to sign a piece of paper entering judgment on a guilty verdict should mean that the defendant is precluded from arguing his parole ineligibility to the jury. We should also not be distracted by the plurality's red herring—the possibility of setting aside the verdict by a post-trial motion. Not only is that possibility indistinguishable from the non-exhaustive list of hypothetical future possibilities we dismissed in Simmons, but it also fails to distinguish this case from the many other possibilities that are part of the state criminal justice system, and fails to distinguish Ramdass' convictions from each other.
The plurality's convoluted understanding of Simmons and its diverse implications necessitate a fair amount of disentangling of its argument. But, once again, this should not divert us from the plain reality of this case. Juries want to know about parole ineligibility. We know how important
is precisely the argument that Virginia raised on remand to the Virginia Supreme Court. That court was not persuaded by the argument, nor was any court during the entire state and federal habeas proceedings. See, e. g., App. 219, 225-226, 281-284 (Magistrate's Report) (discussing its own and other courts' rejection of waiver argument); 187 F. 3d, at 402 (case below) (same). It is therefore not surprising that Virginia failed to argue waiver in its brief in opposition and arguments not raised therein are themselves normally deemed waived. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, 75, n. 13 (1996).
Finally, that Ramdass' counsel argued that he would go to jail "for the rest of his life" does not at all satisfy Simmons' requirement. Ante, at 161. The entire point of Simmons is that the jury will often misunderstand what it means to sentence a defendant to "life." Consequently, that Ramdass was able to tell the jury he would get "life" simply does not help unless he is also permitted to tell the jury that life means life without the possibility of parole. Indeed, the very fact that the jury's question came after counsel made this argument demonstrates that the jury was uncertain about what that statement meant.
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