210
Stevens, J., dissenting
it is to their life-and-death decisionmaking. We know how misinformed they are likely to be if we do not give them this information. We know Simmons has worked,36 and we
know the States have wholeheartedly embraced it.37
Moreover, we know this jury thought the information was critical; we know this jury misunderstood what a "life" sentence meant; we know this jury would have recommended life instead of death if it had known that Ramdass was parole ineligible; and we know this jury did not get a clear answer to its question. We also know that Virginia entrusts to the jury the solemn duty of recommending life or death for the defendant. Why does the Court insist that the Constitution permits the wool to be pulled over their eyes?
I respectfully dissent.
36 See, e. g., Finn, Washington Post, at A1 (recounting how, after Virginia adopted life without parole alternative in 1995, and after Simmons, "[t]he number of people given the death sentence in Virginia has plummeted," and describing "[s]imilar declines . . . in Georgia and Indiana" as well as in Maryland).
37 See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 519 S. E. 2d 602 (1999) (extending Simmons to apply even when State does not argue future dangerousness); ante, at 178.
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