Cite as: 530 U. S. 255 (2000)
Syllabus
from "otherwise innocent conduct." Id., at 72. In this case, interpreting § 2113(a) not to apply to a person who engages in innocent, if aberrant, activity is accomplished simply by requiring general intent— i. e., proof of knowledge with respect to the crime's actus reus (here, the taking of property of another by force or violence or intimidation). See, e. g., Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 611-612. And once this mental state and actus reus are shown, the concerns underlying the presumption in favor of scienter are fully satisfied, for a forceful taking—even by a defendant taking under a good-faith claim of right— falls outside the realm of the "otherwise innocent." Thus, the presumption in favor of scienter does not justify reading a specific intent requirement—"intent to steal or purloin"—into § 2113(a). Carter's reliance on § 2113(a)'s legislative history is unavailing in light of this Court's approach to statutory interpretation, which begins by examining the text, see, e. g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475, not by psychoanalyzing those who enacted it, Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U. S. 264, 279. Pp. 267-271.
(ii) Similarly, Carter's claim that § 2113(b)'s "takes and carries away" requirement should be deemed implicit in § 2113(a) also fails. His argument that "takes" in § 2113(a) is equivalent to "takes and carries away" in § 2113(b) is at war with the statute's text. His suggestion that the text is not dispositive because nothing in § 2113(a)'s evolution suggests that Congress sought to discard the common-law asportation requirement ignores the fact that the Court's inquiry begins with the textual product of Congress' efforts, not with speculation as to the internal thought processes of its Members. Congress is free to outlaw bank theft that does not involve asportation, and it hardly would have been absurd for Congress to do so, since the taking-without-asportation scenario has actually occurred. While the common law's decision to require asportation may have its virtues, Congress adopted a different view in § 2113(a), and it is not for this Court to question that choice. P. 272. (iii) Finally, the Court disagrees with Carter's claim that § 2113(b)'s requirement that the property taken have a "value exceeding $1,000" is a sentencing factor, not an element of the crime. First, § 2113(b)'s structure strongly suggests that its two paragraphs—the first of which uses the phrase in question, requiring that the property taken have "value exceeding $1,000," the second of which refers to property of "value not exceeding $1,000"—describe distinct offenses. Each begins with the word "[w]hoever," proceeds to describe identically (apart from the differing valuation requirements) the elements of the offense, and concludes by stating the prescribed punishment. That these pro-
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