Cite as: 530 U. S. 703 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
ism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989), he noted that " '[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.' " He found that the text of the statute "applies to all viewpoints, rather [than] only certain viewpoints," and that the legislative history made it clear that the State had not favored one viewpoint over another.11 He concluded that the "free zone" created by the statute was narrowly tailored under the test announced in Ward, and that it left open ample alternative means of communication because signs and leaflets may be seen, and speech may be heard, at a distance of eight feet. Noting that petitioners had stated in their affidavits that they intended to "continue with their protected First Amendment activities," he rejected their overbreadth challenge because he believed "the statute will do little to deter protected speech." 12 Finally, he concluded that the statute was not vague and that the prior restraint doctrine was inapplicable because the "statute requires no license or permit scheme prior to speaking." 13
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed for reasons similar to those given by the District Judge. It noted that even though only seven percent of the patients receiving services at one of the clinics were there to obtain abortion services, all 60,000 of that clinic's patients "were subjected to the same treatment by the protesters." 14 It also reviewed our then-recent decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994), and concluded that Madsen's reasoning supported the conclusion that the statute was content neutral.15
11 Id., at 32a-33a.
12 Id., at 35a.
13 Id., at 36a.
14 Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P. 2d 670, 672 (1995).
15 Id., at 673-674.
711
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