Cite as: 530 U. S. 703 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
tent neutral, that petitioners no longer contended otherwise, and that they agreed that the question for decision was whether the statute was a valid time, place, and manner restriction under the test announced in Ward.19
The court identified two important distinctions between this case and Schenck. First, Schenck involved a judicial decree and therefore, as explained in Madsen, posed "greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances." 20 Second, unlike the floating buffer zone in Schenck, which would require a protester either to stop talking or to get off the sidewalk whenever a patient came within 15 feet, the "knowingly approaches" requirement in the Colorado statute allows a protester to stand still while a person moving toward or away from a health care facility walks past her.21 Applying the test in Ward, the court concluded that the statute was narrowly drawn to further a significant government interest. It rejected petitioners' contention that it was not narrow enough because it applied to all health care facilities in the State. In the court's view, the comprehensive coverage of the statute was a factor that supported its content neutrality. Moreover, the fact that the statute was enacted, in part, because the General
19 "[P]etitioners concede that the test for a time, place, and manner restriction is the appropriate measure of this statute's constitutionality. See Tape Recording of Oral Argument, Oct. 19, 1998, statement of James M. Henderson, Esq. Petitioners argue that pursuant to the test announced in Ward, the 'floating buffer zone' created by section 18-9-122(3) is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and that section 18-9-122(3) does not provide for ample alternative channels of communication. We disagree." Id., at 1251.
"We note that both the trial court and the court of appeals found that section 18-9-122(3) is content-neutral, and that petitioners do not contend otherwise in this appeal." Id., at 1256.
20 Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 764 (1994).
21 973 P. 2d, at 1257-1258 ("What renders this statute less restrictive than . . . the injunction in Schenck . . . is that under section 18-9-122(3), there is no duty to withdraw placed upon petitioners even within the eight-foot limited floating buffer zone").
713
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