812
Opinion of Thomas, J.
program is made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited and . . . creates no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education. . . . [T]he fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the State.
. . . . . "[I]t does not seem appropriate to view any aid ultimately flowing to the Inland Empire School of the Bible as resulting from a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion." 474 U. S., at 487-488 (footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).6
Further, five Members of this Court, in separate opinions, emphasized both the importance of neutrality and of private choices, and the relationship between the two. See id., at
6 The majority opinion also noted that only a small portion of the overall aid under the State's program would go to religious education, see Witters, 474 U. S., at 488, but it appears that five Members of the Court thought this point irrelevant. See id., at 491, n. 3 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 401 (1983), to assert that validity of program "does not depend on the fact that petitioner appears to be the only handicapped student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training"); 474 U. S., at 490 (White, J., concurring) (agreeing with "most of Justice Powell's concurring opinion with respect to the relevance of Mueller," but not specifying further); id., at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (agreeing with Justice Powell's reliance on Mueller and explaining that the program did not have an impermissible effect, because it was neutral and involved private choice, and thus "[n]o reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief"). More recently, in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1997), we held that the proportion of aid benefiting students at religious schools pursuant to a neutral program involving private choices was irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. Id., at 229 (re-fusing "to conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program depends on the number of sectarian school students who happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid"); see also post, at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting this passage).
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