Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 26 (2000)

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Cite as: 530 U. S. 793 (2000)

Opinion of Thomas, J.

given to religious schools or entities directly rather than, as in Witters and Mueller, indirectly. See 515 U. S., at 842 (collecting cases); id., at 846-847 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 608-609 (1988); compare Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980), with Levitt v. Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472 (1973).8 But

8 The reason for such concern is not that the form per se is bad, but that such a form creates special risks that governmental aid will have the effect of advancing religion (or, even more, a purpose of doing so). An indirect form of payment reduces these risks. See Mueller, 463 U. S., at 399 (neutral tax deduction, because of its indirect form, allowed economic benefit to religious schools only as result of private choice and thus did not suggest state sanction of schools' religious messages). It is arguable, however, at least after Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), that the principles of neutrality and private choice would be adequate to address those special risks, for it is hard to see the basis for deciding Witters differently simply if the State had sent the tuition check directly to whichever school Witters chose to attend. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 848 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining Witters as reconciling principle of neutrality with principle against public funding of religious messages by relying on principle of private choice). Similarly, we doubt it would be unconstitutional if, to modify Witters' hypothetical, see 474 U. S., at 486- 487; supra, at 816, a government employer directly sent a portion of an employee's paycheck to a religious institution designated by that employee pursuant to a neutral charitable program. We approved a similar arrangement in Quick Bear, 210 U. S., at 77-82, and the Federal Government appears to have long had such a program, see 1999 Catalog of Caring: Combined Federal Campaign of the National Capital Area 44, 45, 59, 74-75 (listing numerous religious organizations, many of which engage in religious education or in proselytizing, to which federal employees may contribute via payroll deductions); see generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788 (1985) (discussing Combined Federal Campaign). Finally, at least some of our prior cases striking down direct payments involved serious concerns about whether the payments were truly neutral. See, e. g., Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 762-764, 768, 774-780 (1973) (striking down, by 8-to-1 vote, program providing direct grants for maintenance and repair of school facilities, where payments were allocated per-pupil but were only

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