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Opinion of the Court
ized determinations," which this scheme does not, "the decisionmaker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority." American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U. S. 606, 612 (1991); accord, Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 467 (1983). The approach pressed by Lopez—case-by-case decisionmaking in thousands of cases each year, see supra, at 243, n. 4—could invite favoritism, disunity, and inconsistency. The Bureau is not required continually to revisit "issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding." Heckler, 461 U. S., at 467.6
Having decided that the Bureau may categorically exclude prisoners based on their preconviction conduct, we further hold that the regulation excluding Lopez is permissible. The Bureau reasonably concluded that an inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision.7
conduct, the structured "[i]ndividualized [BOP] consideration" the dissent would allow, post, at 249, seems but a shade different from the forthright categorical exclusion the Bureau has adopted.
6 Amici urge reversal on the ground that the Bureau violated the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act when it published the 1997 regulation. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 18-24. We decline to address this matter, which was not raised or decided below, or presented in the petition for certiorari. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 340, n. 3 (1997).
7 Lopez invokes the rule of lenity in urging us to accede to his interpretation. Because, as discussed above, the statute cannot be read to prohibit the Bureau from exercising its discretion categorically or on the basis of preconviction conduct, his reliance on the rule is unavailing. See Caron v. United States, 524 U. S. 308, 316 (1998) ("The rule of lenity is not invoked by a grammatical possibility. It does not apply if the ambiguous reading relied on is an implausible reading of the congressional purpose.").
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