274
Stevens, J., dissenting
effect of its improper implementation.4 A suit based on these conditions cannot prevail.
* * *
The Washington Act does not provide on its face for punitive conditions of confinement, and the actual conditions under which the Act is implemented are of no concern to our inquiry. I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as "criminal" or "civil" in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5-to-4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invali-4 The dissent argues that, "under the majority's analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction," post, at 276 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Although it is unclear to me whether the dissent is correct on this score, I hope that state and federal courts so interpret the majority opinion. For even if the majority opinion does not preclude venturing beyond the face of the statute, Hudson certainly does. See Hudson, 522 U. S., at 101 (holding that courts must examine a statute " 'on its face' " and may not consider the " 'actual sanctions imposed' "); supra, at 272.
To dispel any suggestion to the contrary, ante, at 261-262, 263, 266 (majority opinion); post, at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting), I note that Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997), does not provide support for implementation-based challenges. In Hendricks, "none of the parties argue[d] that people institutionalized under the . . . civil commitment statute are subject to punitive conditions." Id., at 363. The viability of an implementation-based challenge was simply not at issue. And significantly, six months after Hendricks, we held in Hudson that inquiries into whether a statute is civil are restricted to the "face" of the statute. Hudson, supra, at 101. To the extent that Hendricks (or any previous opinion, ante, at 266 (majority opinion)) left a door open by not answering the implementation question, Hudson closed that door.
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