Cite as: 531 U. S. 250 (2001)
Stevens, J., dissenting
the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite "clearest proof." This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute.3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washington's criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment.4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the "clearest proof" that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washington's statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
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