Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 18 (2001)

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292

ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL

Opinion of the Court

our cases in the amendments would thus not help respondents. Another problem is that the incorporation claim itself is flawed. Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, on which only respondents rely, by its terms applies only to suits "for a violation of a statute," 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (emphasis added). It therefore does not speak to suits for violations of regulations that go beyond the statutory proscription of § 601. Section 6 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 is even less on point. That provision amends Title VI to make the term "program or activity" cover larger portions of the institutions receiving federal financial aid than it had previously covered, see Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555 (1984). It is impossible to understand what this has to do with implied causes of action—which is why we declared in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S., at 73, that § 6 did not "in any way alte[r] the existing rights of action and the corresponding remedies permissible under . . . Title VI." Respondents point to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S., at 381-382, which inferred congressional intent to ratify lower court decisions regarding a particular statutory provision when Congress comprehensively revised the statutory scheme but did not amend that provision. But we recently criticized Curran's reliance on congressional inaction, saying that "[a]s a general matter . . . [the] argumen[t] deserve[s] little weight in the interpretive process." Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S., at 187. And when, as here, Congress has not comprehensively revised a statutory scheme but has made only isolated amendments, we have spoken more bluntly: "It is 'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 175, n. 1 (1989) (quoting Johnson

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