Cite as: 532 U. S. 275 (2001)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Five years later, we more explicitly considered whether a private right of action exists to enforce the guarantees of Title VI and its gender-based twin, Title IX. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979). In that case, we examined the text of the statutes, analyzed the purpose of the laws, and canvassed the relevant legislative history. Our conclusion was unequivocal: "We have no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination." Id., at 703.
The majority acknowledges that Cannon is binding precedent with regard to both Title VI and Title IX, ante, at 279-280, but seeks to limit the scope of its holding to cases involving allegations of intentional discrimination. The distinction the majority attempts to impose is wholly foreign to Cannon's text and reasoning. The opinion in Cannon consistently treats the question presented in that case as whether a private right of action exists to enforce "Title IX" (and by extension "Title VI"),3 and does not draw any distinctions between the various types of discrimination outlawed by the operation of those statutes. Though the opinion did not reach out to affirmatively preclude the drawing of every conceivable distinction, it could hardly have been more clear as to the scope of its holding: A private right of action exists for "victims of the prohibited discrimination." 441 U. S., at 703 (emphasis added). Not some of the prohibited discrimination, but all of it.4
five years old. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268 (1969).
3 See Cannon, 441 U. S., at 687, 699, 702, n. 33, 703, 706, n. 40, 709.
4 The majority is undoubtedly correct that Cannon was not a case about the substance of Title IX but rather about the remedies available under that statute. Therefore, Cannon cannot stand as a precedent for the proposition either that Title IX and its implementing regulations reach intentional discrimination or that they do not do so. What Cannon did hold is that all the discrimination prohibited by the regulatory scheme
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