360
O'Connor, J., dissenting
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81 (2000) (of "any person who commits any crime in the presence of [an] officer");
Wash. Rev. Code § 10.31.100 (Supp. 2001), as amended by 2000 Wash. Laws 119, § 4 (for misdemeanors committed in the presence of the officer); W. Va. Code § 62-10-9 (2000) ("for all violations of any of the criminal laws of the United States, or of this state, when committed in [an officer's] presence");
Wis. Stat. § 968.07(1)(d) (1998) (when "[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed a crime"); and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-102(b)(i) (1999) (when "[a]ny criminal offense" is committed "in the officer's presence").
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." The Court recognizes that the arrest of Gail Atwater was a "pointless indignity" that served no discernible state interest, ante, at 347, and yet holds that her arrest was constitutionally permissible. Because the Court's position is inconsistent with the explicit guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, I dissent.
I
A full custodial arrest, such as the one to which Ms. Atwater was subjected, is the quintessential seizure. See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585 (1980). When a full custodial arrest is effected without a warrant, the plain language of the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrest be reasonable. See ibid. It is beyond cavil that "[t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' " Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 108-109 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19
Page: Index Previous 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007