Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 55 (2001)

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372

ATWATER v. LAGO VISTA

O'Connor, J., dissenting

laws, but rather with the manner in which they may be enforced. Under today's holding, when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a fine-only misdemeanor offense has occurred, that officer may stop the suspect, issue a citation, and let the person continue on her way. Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S., at 806. Or, if a traffic violation, the officer may stop the car, arrest the driver, see ante, at 354, search the driver, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S., at 235, search the entire passenger compartment of the car including any purse or package inside, see New York v. Belton, 453 U. S., at 460, and impound the car and inventory all of its contents, see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 374 (1987); Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1990). Although the Fourth Amendment expressly requires that the latter course be a reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances of the offense, the majority gives officers unfettered discretion to choose that course without articulating a single reason why such action is appropriate.

Such unbounded discretion carries with it grave potential for abuse. The majority takes comfort in the lack of evidence of "an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests." Ante, at 353, and n. 25. But the relatively small number of published cases dealing with such arrests proves little and should provide little solace. Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual. After today, the arsenal available to any officer extends to a full arrest and the searches permissible concomitant to that arrest. An officer's subjective motivations for making a traffic stop are not relevant considerations in determining the reasonableness of the stop. See Whren v. United States, supra, at 813. But it is precisely because these motivations are beyond our purview that we must vigilantly ensure that officers' poststop actions—which are properly within our reach—comport with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of reasonableness.

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