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Opinion of the Court
beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just one consideration among many." Galanter & Luban, 42 Am. U. L. Rev., at 1450.13
Differences in the institutional competence of trial judges and appellate judges are consistent with our conclusion. In Gore, we instructed courts evaluating a punitive damages award's consistency with due process to consider three criteria: (1) the degree or reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the disparity between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 517 U. S., at 574-575. Only with respect to the first Gore inquiry do the district courts have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals, and even then the advantage exists primarily with respect to issues turning on witness credibility and demeanor.14 Trial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable of analyzing the second factor. And the third Gore criterion, which calls for a broad legal comparison, seems more suited to the expertise of appellate courts. Considerations of institutional competence therefore fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate review.
13 We express no opinion on the question whether Gasperini would govern—and de novo review would be inappropriate—if a State were to adopt a scheme that tied the award of punitive damages more tightly to the jury's finding of compensatory damages. This might be the case, for example, if the State's scheme constrained a jury to award only the exact amount of punitive damages it determined was necessary to obtain economically optimal deterrence or if it defined punitive damages as a multiple of compensatory damages (e. g., treble damages).
14 While we have determined that the Court of Appeals must review the District Court's application of the Gore test de novo, it of course remains true that the Court of Appeals should defer to the District Court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 336-337, n. 10 (1998).
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