Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 25 (2001)

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448

COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. LEATHERMAN TOOL GROUP, INC.

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

common-law jurisprudence." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 580 ("The principle that exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compensatory damages has a long pedigree."). The third guidepost—comparability of sanctions for comparable misconduct—is not similarly rooted in common law, nor is it similarly factbound. As the Court states, "the third Gore criterion . . . calls for a broad legal comparison." Ante, at 440. But to the extent the inquiry is "legal" in character, there is little difference between review de novo and review for abuse of discretion. Cf. Gasperini, 518 U. S., at 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is a familiar . . . maxim that deems an error of law an abuse of discretion.").1

Apart from "Seventh Amendment constraints," an abuse-of-discretion standard also makes sense for "practical reasons." Id., at 438. With respect to the first Gore inquiry (i. e., reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct), district courts have an undeniably superior vantage over courts of appeals. As earlier noted, supra, at 445, district courts view the evidence not on a "cold paper record," but "in the living courtroom context," Gasperini, 518 U. S., at 438. They can assess from the best seats the vital matter of witness credibility. And "it of course remains true that [a]

1 Appellate courts, following our instruction, apply de novo review to trial court determinations of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and excessiveness of fines. See ante, at 435-436 (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 336-337, n. 10 (1998), and Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696-698 (1996)). But such determinations typically are made without jury involvement, see, e. g., Bajakajian, 524 U. S., at 325- 326; Ornelas, 517 U. S., at 694, and surely do not implicate the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, although Bajakajian said "the question whether a [criminal] fine is constitutionally excessive calls for . . . de novo review," 524 U. S., at 336-337, n. 10, Bajakajian did not disturb our holding in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U. S. 257 (1989), that the "Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of punitive damages in [civil] cases between private parties," id., at 260.

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