Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 16 (2001)

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Cite as: 532 U. S. 36 (2001)

Opinion of the Court

that the jury was free to decide "whether . . . for any reason or no reason at all Mr. Shafer should be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than to death." App. 203.

In sum, when the jury determines the existence of a statutory aggravator, a tightly circumscribed factual inquiry, none of Simmons' due process concerns arise. There are no "misunderstanding[s]" to avoid, no "false choice[s]" to guard against. See Simmons, 512 U. S., at 161 (plurality opinion). The jury, as aggravating circumstance factfinder, exercises no sentencing discretion itself. If no aggravator is found, the judge takes over and has sole authority to impose the mandatory minimum so heavily relied upon by the South Carolina Supreme Court. See supra, at 46-47, 49-50. It is only when the jury endeavors the moral judgment whether to impose the death penalty that parole eligibility may become critical. Correspondingly, it is only at that stage that Simmons comes into play, a stage at which South Carolina law provides no third choice, no 30-year mandatory minimum, just death or life without parole. See Ramdass, 530 U. S., at 169 (Simmons applies where "as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison." (emphasis added)).5 We

therefore hold that whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding under South Carolina's new scheme, due process requires that the jury be informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of parole.

5 Tellingly, the State acknowledged at oral argument that if future dangerousness was a factor, and the jury first reported finding an aggravator before going on to its sentencing recommendation, a Simmons charge would at that point be required. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. We see no signifi-cant difference between that situation and the one presented here. Nor does Justice Thomas' dissent in this case plausibly urge any such distinction. See post, at 56-58. If the jurors should be told life means no parole in the hypothesized bifurcated sentencing proceeding, they should be equally well informed in the actual uninterrupted proceeding.

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