52
Opinion of the Court
III
South Carolina offers two other grounds in support of the trial judge's refusal to give Shafer's requested parole ineligibility instruction. First, the State argues that the jury was properly informed of the law on parole ineligibility by the trial court's instructions and by defense counsel's own argument. Second, the State contends that no parole ineligibility instruction was required under Simmons because the State never argued Shafer would pose a future danger to society. We now turn to those arguments.
A
"Even if this Court finds Simmons was triggered," the State urges, "the defense's closing argument and the judge's charge fulfilled the requirements of Simmons." Brief for Respondent 38. To support that contention, the State sets out defense counsel's closing pleas that, if Shafer's life is spared, he will "die in prison" after "spend[ing] his natural life there." Id., at 39. Next, the State recites passages from the trial judge's instructions reiterating that "life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant." Id., at 40.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, we note, never suggested that counsel's arguments or the trial judge's instructions satisfied Simmons. That court simply held Simmons inapplicable under the State's new sentencing scheme. 340 S. C., at 298, 531 S. E. 2d, at 528. We do not find the State's position persuasive. Displacement of "the longstanding practice of parole availability" remains a relatively recent development, and "common sense tells us that many jurors might not know whether a life sentence carries with it the possibility of parole." Simmons, 512 U. S., at 177-178 (O'Connor, J.). South Carolina's situation is illustrative. Until two years before Shafer's trial, as we earlier noted, the State's law did not categorically preclude parole for capital
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