NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 15 (2001)

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720

NLRB v. KENTUCKY RIVER COMMUNITY CARE, INC.

Opinion of the Court

burg, J., dissenting), and which are adopted by Justice Stevens in this case, see post, at 726-727, the Board contends that its interpretation is necessary to preserve the inclusion of "professional employees" within the coverage of the Act. See § 2(12), 29 U. S. C. § 152(12). Professional employees by definition engage in work "involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment." § 152(12)(a)(ii). Therefore, the Board argues (enlisting dictum from our decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U. S., at 690, and n. 30, that was rejected in Health Care, see 511 U. S., at 581-582), if judgment of that sort makes one a supervisor under § 152(11), then Congress's intent to include professionals in the Act will be frustrated, because "many professional employees (such as lawyers, doctors, and nurses) customarily give judgment-based direction to the less-skilled employees with whom they work," Brief for Petitioner 33. The problem with the argument is not the soundness of its labor policy (the Board is entitled to judge that without our constant second-guessing, see, e. g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U. S. 775, 786 (1990)). It is that the policy cannot be given effect through this statutory text. See Health Care, supra, at 581 ("[T]here may be 'some tension between the Act's exclusion of [supervisory and] managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals,' but we find no authority for 'suggesting that that tension can be resolved' by distorting the statutory language in the manner proposed by the Board") (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., supra, at 686). Perhaps the Board could offer a limiting interpretation of the supervisory function of responsible direction by distinguishing employees who direct the manner of others' performance of discrete tasks from employees who direct other employees, as § 152(11) requires. Certain of the Board's decisions appear to have drawn that distinction in the past, see, e. g., Providence Hospital, 320 N. L. R. B. 717, 729 (1996). We have no occasion to consider it here, however, because the Board has carefully

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