Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 24 (2001)

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Cite as: 532 U. S. 782 (2001)

Opinion of Thomas, J.

an opportunity to consider the evidence Penry presented, I respectfully dissent.

As a habeas reviewing court, we are not called upon to propose what we believe to be the ideal instruction on how a jury should take into account evidence related to Penry's childhood and mental status. Our job is much simpler, and it is significantly removed from writing the instruction in the first instance. We must decide merely whether the conclusion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—that the sentencing court's supplemental instruction explaining how the jury could give effect to any mitigating value it found in Penry's evidence satisfied the requirements of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989) (Penry I)—was "objectively unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 409 (2000). See also 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. V).

At Penry's first sentencing, the court read to the jury Texas' three special issues for capital sentencing.1 The court did not instruct the jury that "it could consider the evidence offered by Penry as mitigating evidence and that it could give mitigating effect to that evidence in imposing sentence." 492 U. S., at 320. The prosecutor also did not offer any way for the jury to give mitigating effect to the evidence, but instead simply reiterated that the jury was to answer the three questions and follow the law. In Penry I, this Court concluded that, "[i]n light of the prosecutor's ar-1 The special issues are: " '(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; " '(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and " '(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.' " Penry I, 492 U. S. 302, 310 (1989) (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 1989)).

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