Cite as: 532 U. S. 782 (2001)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
evidence Penry presented as mitigating evidence and that, if they believe the mitigating evidence makes a death sentence inappropriate, they should answer "no" to one of the special issues. Given this straightforward reading of the instructions, it is objectively reasonable, if not eminently logical, to conclude that a reasonable juror would have believed he had a "vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence." 492 U. S., at 326.
It is true that Penry's proffered evidence did not fit neatly into any of the three special issues for imposing the death penalty under Texas law.3 But the sentencing court told the jury in no uncertain terms precisely how to follow this Court's directive in Penry I. First, the sentencing court instructed the jury that it could consider such evidence to be mitigating evidence. See App. 675 ("[W]hen you deliberate on the questions posed in the special issues, you are to consider mitigating circumstances, if any, supported by the evidence presented in both phases of the trial, whether presented by the state or the defendant. A mitigating circumstance may include, but is not limited to, any aspect of the defendant's character and record or circumstances of the crime which you believe could make a death sentence inappropriate in this case"). Next, the court explained to the jury how it must give effect to the evidence. Ibid. ("If you find that there are any mitigating circumstances in this case, you must decide how much weight they deserve, if any, and therefore, give effect and consideration to them in assessing the defendant's personal culpability at the time you answer the special issue"). And finally, the court unambiguously instructed: "If you determine, when giving
3 I am still bewildered as to why this Court finds it unconstitutional for Texas to limit consideration of mitigating evidence to those factors relevant to the three special issues. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). But we need not address this broader issue to uphold Penry's sentence.
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