Cite as: 532 U. S. 67 (2001)
Scalia, J., dissenting
There remains to be considered the first possible basis for invalidating this search, which is that the patients were coerced to produce their urine samples by their necessitous circumstances, to wit, their need for medical treatment of their pregnancy. If that was coercion, it was not coercion applied by the government—and if such nongovernmental coercion sufficed, the police would never be permitted to use the ballistic evidence obtained from treatment of a patient with a bullet wound. And the Fourth Amendment would invalidate those many state laws that require physicians to report gunshot wounds,5 evidence of spousal abuse,6 and (like the South Carolina law relevant here, see S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7-510 (2000)) evidence of child abuse.7
show that the Petitioners consented to MUSC disclosing the information to law enforcement." Brief for Respondents 39.
In sum, I think it clear that the Court's disposition requires the holding that violation of a relationship of trust constitutes a search. The opinion itself implies that in its description of the issue left for the Court of Appeals on remand, see ante, at 77, n. 11: whether "the tests were performed without the informed consent of the patients," ante, at 77 (emphasis added)—informed, that is, that the urine would be tested for drugs and that the results would be given to the police. I am happy, of course, to accept the Court's illogical assurance that it intends no such holding, and urge the Court of Appeals on remand to do the same.
5 See, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 11160 (West Supp. 2001); N. Y. Penal Law § 265.25 (McKinney 2000); S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1072 (Supp. 2000).
6 See, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 11160 (West Supp. 2001); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36-135 (2000).
7 The Court contends that I "would have us . . . resolve the issue of consent in favor of respondents," whereas the Court's opinion "more prudent[ly] allow[s] [the Court of Appeals] to resolve the legal and factual issues in the first instance, and . . . express[es] no view on those issues." Ante, at 77, n. 11. That is not entirely so. The Court does not resolve the factual issue whether there was consent to the drug testing and to providing the results to the police; and neither do I. But the Court does resolve the legal issue whether that consent was necessary, see ante, at 77, 84-85, and n. 24; and so do I. Since the Court concludes it was necessary, the factual inquiry is left for the Fourth Circuit on remand. Since I conclude it was not necessary (and since no one contends that the taking
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