Cite as: 532 U. S. 67 (2001)
Scalia, J., dissenting
neous, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a). Not only do I find it supportable; I think any other finding would have to be overturned.
The cocaine tests started in April 1989, neither at police suggestion nor with police involvement. Expectant mothers who tested positive were referred by hospital staff for substance-abuse treatment, ante, at 70 (opinion of the Court)—an obvious health benefit to both mother and child. See App. 43 (testimony that a single use of cocaine can cause fetal damage). And, since "[i]nfants whose mothers abuse cocaine during pregnancy are born with a wide variety of physical and neurological abnormalities," ante, at 89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), which require medical attention, see Brief in Opposition A76-A77, the tests were of additional medical benefit in predicting needed postnatal treatment for the child. Thus, in their origin—before the police were in any way involved—the tests had an immediate, not merely an "ultimate," ante, at 82 (opinion of the Court), purpose of improving maternal and infant health. Several months after the testing had been initiated, a nurse discovered that local police were arresting pregnant users of cocaine for child abuse, the hospital's general counsel wrote the county solicitor to ask "what, if anything, our Medical Center needs to do to assist you in this matter," App. 499 (South Carolina law requires child abuse to be reported, see S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7-510), the police suggested ways to avoid tainting evidence, and the hospital and police in conjunction used the testing program as a means of securing what the Court calls the "ultimate" health benefit of coercing drug-abusing mothers into drug treatment. See ante, at 70- 73, 82. Why would there be any reason to believe that, once
it's done in conjunction with the police and that implicates the Fourth Amendment.' " Ante, at 75, n. 8, quoting App. 1247-1249. But all this shows is that the explicit finding of medical purpose was not a finding of exclusive medical purpose. As discussed later in text, the special-needs doctrine contains no such exclusivity requirement.
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