Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 9 (2001)

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Cite as: 533 U. S. 167 (2001)

Opinion of the Court

delimit the entire class of applications for review that toll the limitation period. A construction under which the word "State" does nothing more than further modify "post-conviction" relegates "State" to quite an insignificant role in the statutory provision. We believe that our duty to "give each word some operative effect" where possible, Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S. 202, 209 (1997), requires more in this context.

The Court of Appeals characterized petitioner's interpretation as producing the "linguistic oddity" of "State other collateral review," which is "an ungainly construction that [the Court of Appeals did] not believe Congress intended." 208 F. 3d, at 360. But nothing precludes the application of the word "State" to the entire phrase "post-conviction or other collateral review," regardless of the resulting construction that one posits. The term "other collateral" is easily understood as a unit to which "State" applies just as "State" applies to "post-conviction." Moreover, petition-er's interpretation does not compel the verbal formula hypothesized by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the ungainliness of "State other collateral review" is a very good reason why Congress might have avoided that precise verbal formulation in the first place. The application of the word "State" to the phrase "other collateral review" more naturally yields the understanding "other State collateral review."

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that petitioner's reading of the statute fails to give operative effect to the phrase "other collateral review." The court claimed that "the phrase 'other collateral review' would be meaningless if it did not refer to federal habeas petitions." Ibid. This argument, however, fails because it depends on the incorrect premise that there can be no form of state "collateral" review "other" than state "post-conviction" review within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). To the contrary, it is possible for "other collateral review" to include review of a state court judgment that is not a criminal conviction.

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