Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 13 (2001)

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Cite as: 533 U. S. 167 (2001)

Opinion of the Court

judgment. See, e. g., O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 845 (1999) ("[T]he exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts"); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 518-519 (1982) ("A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error"). This requirement "is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings." Id., at 518. The exhaustion rule promotes comity in that " 'it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.' " Ibid. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950)); see also O'Sullivan, supra, at 844 ("Comity thus dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief").

The 1-year limitation period of § 2244(d)(1) quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments. See generally Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 555-556 (1998). This provision reduces the potential for delay on the road to finality by restricting the time that a prospective federal habeas petitioner has in which to seek federal habeas review.

The tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) balances the interests served by the exhaustion requirement and the limitation period. Section 2244(d)(2) promotes the exhaustion of state remedies by protecting a state prisoner's ability later to apply for federal habeas relief while state remedies are being pursued. At the same time, the provision limits the

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