192
Breyer, J., dissenting
the interest in reducing "piecemeal litigation," ante, at 180, is not likely to be significantly furthered by the majority's holding.
Finally, the majority's construction of the statute will not necessarily promote comity. Federal courts, understanding that dismissal for nonexhaustion may mean the loss of any opportunity for federal habeas review, may tend to read ambiguous earlier state-court proceedings as having adequately exhausted a federal petition's current claims. For similar reasons, wherever possible, they may reach the merits of a federal petition's claims without sending the petitioner back to state court for exhaustion. To that extent, the majority's interpretation will result in a lesser, not a greater, respect for the state interests to which the majority refers. In addition, by creating pressure to expedite consideration of habeas petitions and to reach the merits of arguably exhausted claims, it will impose a heavier burden on the district courts. (While Justice Stevens' sound suggestions that district courts hold mixed petitions in abeyance and employ equitable tolling, see ante, at 182-184 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), would properly ameliorate some of the unfairness of the majority's interpretation, they will also add to the burdens on the district courts in a way that simple tolling for federal habeas petitions would not.)
In two recent cases, we have assumed that Congress did not want to deprive state prisoners of first federal habeas corpus review, and we have interpreted statutory ambiguities accordingly. In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 (1998), we held that a federal habeas petition filed after the initial filing was dismissed as premature should not be deemed a "second or successive" petition barred by § 2244, lest "dismissal . . . for technical procedural reasons . . . bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review." Id., at 645. And in Slack v. McDaniel, we held that a federal habeas petition filed after dismissal of an initial filing for nonexhaustion should not be deemed a "second
Page: Index Previous 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007