Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 5 (2002)

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Cite as: 534 U. S. 407 (2002)

Opinion of the Court

Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender who, according to at least one of the State's psychiatric witnesses, suffers from both exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. In re Crane, 269 Kan. 578, 580-581, 7 P. 3d 285, 287 (2000); cf. also American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 569 (rev. 4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV) (detailing exhibitionism), 701-706 (detailing antisocial personality disorder). After a jury trial, the Kansas District Court ordered Crane's civil commitment. 269 Kan., at 579-584, 7 P. 3d, at 286-288. But the Kansas Supreme Court reversed. Id., at 586, 7 P. 3d, at 290. In that court's view, the Federal Constitution as interpreted in Hendricks insists upon "a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior"—even if (as provided by Kansas law) problems of "emotional capacity" and not "volitional capacity" prove the "source of bad behavior" warranting commitment. 269 Kan., at 586, 7 P. 3d, at 290; see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b) (2000 Cum. Supp.) (defining "[m]ental abnormality" as a condition that affects an individual's emotional or volitional capacity). And the trial court had made no such finding.

Kansas now argues that the Kansas Supreme Court wrongly read Hendricks as requiring the State always to prove that a dangerous individual is completely unable to control his behavior. That reading, says Kansas, is far too rigid.

III

We agree with Kansas insofar as it argues that Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control. Hendricks referred to the Kansas Act as requiring a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that makes it "diffi-cult, if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior." 521 U. S., at 358 (emphasis added). The word "difficult" indicates that the lack of control to which this Court referred was not absolute. Indeed, as different amici on opposite sides of this case agree, an absolutist approach is unworkable. Brief for Association for the

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