Cite as: 534 U. S. 407 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
ality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b) (1994)." Id., at 358 (emphasis added).
It is the italicized language in the foregoing excerpt that today's majority relies upon as establishing the requirement of a separate finding of inability to control behavior. Ante, at 411-412.
That is simply not a permissible reading of the passage, for several reasons. First, because the authority cited for the statement—in the immediately following reference to the Kansas Statutes Annotated—is the section of the SVPA that defines "mental abnormality," which contains no requirement of inability to control.* What the opinion was obviously saying was that the SVPA's required finding of a causal connection between the likelihood of repeat acts of sexual violence and the existence of a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" necessarily establishes "difficulty if not impossibility" in controlling behavior. This is clearly confirmed by the very next sentence of the opinion, which reads as follows:
"The precommitment requirement of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of . . . other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness." 521 U. S., at 358.
It could not be clearer that, in the Court's estimation, the very existence of a mental abnormality or personality dis*As quoted earlier in the Hendricks opinion, see 521 U. S., at 352, § 59- 29a02(b) defines "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others."
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