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Syllabus
same Act, it is presumed that Congress acted intentionally and purposely. E. g., Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23. Where Congress wanted to provide for successor liability in the Coal Act, it did so explicitly, as demonstrated by §§ 9706(b)(2) and 9711(g)(1). If Congress had meant to make a preenactment successor in interest like Jericol liable, it could have done so clearly and explicitly. Pp. 450-454.
2. The Court rejects the Commissioner's arguments that, in light of the Coal Act's text, structure, and purposes, a direct successor in interest of the entity that was the signatory operator is included within the liability scheme and should be responsible for that operator's Combined Fund premiums if the operator is defunct and there is no other "related person" still in business. Pp. 454-462.
(a) The Act's text supports neither of two readings proposed by the Commissioner. First, the Commissioner argues that, because § 9701(c)(2)(A)'s last sentence states that "related person" "include[s]" a successor in interest of "any person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii)," and because these clauses mention the "signatory operator" itself, that operator is "described" in clause (i) by virtue of the express reference. It is unlikely that Congress, which neither created a separate category for signatory operators nor included signatory operators within the categories, intended to attach liability to a group such as successors in interest to signatory operators through a general clause that was meant to reach persons "described" in one of three explicit categories. Second, the Commissioner argues that, because a signatory operator is necessarily a member of a controlled group of corporations that includes itself under § 9701(c)(2)(A)(i), a "successor in interest" of a member of that group includes a successor in interest of the signatory operator. Section 9701(c)(2)(A)(i), however, cannot be divorced from the clause that begins the related persons provision: "A person shall be considered to be a related person to a signatory operator if that person is—." § 9701(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because it makes little sense for a signatory operator to be related to itself, the statute necessarily implies that a "related person" is a separate entity from a signatory operator. Moreover, the Commissioner's argument only works where the signa-tory operator is actually part of a "controlled group of corporations." The argument has no force here, in any event, because the Commissioner does not contend that Shackleford was part of such a group. Pp. 455-456.
(b) The floor statements of two Senators who sponsored the Coal Act, which the Commissioner alleges support her position, cannot amend the unambiguous language of the statute. There is no reason to give greater weight to a Senator's floor statement than to the collective votes
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