460
Opinion of the Court
First, respondents argue that coal operators undoubtedly would have opposed legislation that seriously expanded their liability with respect to miners that they had never employed,18 and that it is hard to imagine that the 1988 signa-tory companies would have agreed to a compromise that exposed them to open-ended statutory liability linked to decades of buying, selling, and trading property. Brief for Respondents 39-43.
Second, respondents speculate that Congress may have concluded that injecting coal industry successor issues into the Commissioner's task of allocating liability for more than 100,000 UMWA retirees and dependents would consume a disproportionate share of the agency's resources, create grid-lock in the assignment process, precipitate endless operator challenges under the Coal Act's administrative review process, and thwart implementation of the program. Id., at 43- 45. Finally, respondents suggest that Congress could have been concerned about the adverse impact that successor liability might have had on the valuation and sale of union companies and properties.19 Id., at 45-46.
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need neither accept nor reject a particular "plausible" explanation for why Congress would have written a statute
18 Respondents argue that successor liability covering 40 years of preAct transactions could have exploded the number of Combined Fund beneficiaries potentially assignable to the 1988 signatory operators. See Brief for Respondents 41. It would have been difficult for the 1988 signatories to estimate their potential liability under a legislative fix that included successor liability. Thousands of pre-1976 UMWA retirees were potential candidates for assignment to a 1988 NBCWA signatory under such broad based successor liability.
19 If Congress had retroactively burdened coal asset purchasers for financial shortfalls arising from failures under a private party contract, respondents argue, future purchasers would be wary about paying fair market value for coal property. Such concerns might destabilize the unionized industry's economic underpinning, at a time when many assigned operators might need to raise money to help defray costs imposed by the Act.
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