Cite as: 535 U. S. 162 (2002)
Stevens, J., dissenting
exists.' " 450 U. S., at 272, n. 18. It is thus wrong for the Court to interpret Justice Powell's language as referring only to a division of loyalties "that affected counsel's performance." Ante, at 171, and n. 3 (emphasis deleted).11
Wood nowhere hints of this meaning of "actual conflict of interest" 450 U. S., at 273, nor does it reference Sullivan in "shorthand," ante, at 171. Rather, Wood cites Sullivan explicitly in order to make a factual distinction: In a circumstance, such as in Wood, in which the judge knows or should know of the conflict, no showing of adverse effect is required. But when, as in Sullivan, the judge lacked this knowledge, such a showing is required. Wood, 450 U. S., at 272-274.12
11 The Court concedes that if Mickens' attorney had objected to the appointment based upon the conflict of interest and the trial court judge had failed to inquire, then reversal without inquiry into adverse effect would be required. Ante, at 173-174. The Court, in addition to ignoring the mandate of Wood, reads Sullivan too narrowly. In Sullivan we did not ask only whether an objection was made in order to ascertain whether the trial court had a duty to inquire. Rather, we stated that "[n]othing in the circumstances of this case indicates that the trial court had a duty to inquire whether there was a conflict of interest. The provision of separate trials for Sullivan and his codefendants significantly reduced the potential for a divergence in their interests. No participant in Sullivan's trial ever objected to the multiple representation. . . . On these facts, we conclude that the Sixth Amendment imposed upon the trial court no affirmative duty to inquire into the propriety of multiple representation." 446 U. S., at 347-348.
It is also counter to our precedent to treat all Sixth Amendment challenges involving conflicts of interest categorically, without inquiry into the surrounding factual circumstances. In Cronic, we cited Holloway as an example of a case involving "surrounding circumstances [making] it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness was properly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial." Cronic, 466 U. S., at 661, and n. 28. The surrounding circumstances in the present case were far more egregious than those requiring reversal in either Holloway or Wood.
12 Because the appointing judge knew of the conflict, there is no need in this case to decide what should be done when the judge neither knows, nor should know, about the existence of an intolerable conflict. Nevertheless the Court argues that it makes little sense to reverse automatically
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