Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 34 (2002)

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Cite as: 535 U. S. 162 (2002)

Souter, J., dissenting

ant to the position he would have occupied if the judge had taken reasonable steps to fulfill his obligation. But when the problem of conflict comes to judicial attention not prospectively, but only after the fact, the defendant must show an actual conflict with adverse consequence to him in order to get relief. Sullivan, supra, at 349. Fairness requires nothing more, for no judge was at fault in allowing a trial to proceed even though fraught with hidden risk.

In light of what the majority holds today, it bears repeating that, in this coherent scheme established by Holloway and Sullivan, there is nothing legally crucial about an objection by defense counsel to tell a trial judge that conflicting interests may impair the adequacy of counsel's representation. Counsel's objection in Holloway was important as a fact sufficient to put the judge on notice that he should enquire. In most multiple-representation cases, it will take just such an objection to alert a trial judge to prospective conflict, and the Sullivan Court reaffirmed that the judge is obliged to take reasonable prospective action whenever a timely objection is made. 446 U. S., at 346. But the Court also indicated that an objection is not required as a matter of law: "Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an enquiry." Id., at 347. The Court made this clear beyond cavil 10 months later when Justice Powell, the same Justice who wrote the Sullivan opinion, explained in Wood v. Georgia that Sullivan "mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.' " 450 U. S., at 272, n. 18 (emphasis in original).

Since the District Court in this case found that the state judge was on notice of a prospective potential conflict, 74 F. Supp. 2d, at 613-615, this case calls for nothing more than the application of the prospective notice rule announced and exemplified by Holloway and confirmed in Sullivan and Wood. The remedy for the judge's dereliction of duty

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