Cite as: 535 U. S. 212 (2002)
Syllabus
(1) whether the statute unambiguously forbids that interpretation, and if not, (2) whether the interpretation exceeds permissible bounds. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843. First, the Act does not unambiguously forbid the regulation. That the statute's 12-month phrase modifies only "impairment" shows only that the provision says nothing explicitly about the "inability's" duration. Such silence normally creates, but does not resolve, ambiguity. Second, the Agency's construction is permissible. It supplies a duration requirement, which the statute demands, in a way that consistently reconciles the statutory "impairment" and "inability" language. The Agency's regulations also reflect the Agency's own longstanding interpretation, which should be accorded particular deference, North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 522, n. 12. Finally, Congress has frequently amended or reenacted the relevant provisions without change. Walton's claim that Title II's 5-month waiting period for entitlement protects against a claimant with a chronic, but only briefly disabling, disease shows, at most, that the Agency could have chosen other reasonable time periods. Moreover, Title XVI has no such period, yet Walton offers no explanation why its identical definitional language should be interpreted differently in a closely related context. Walton's argument that the Agency's interpretation should be disregarded because its formal regulations were only recently enacted is also rejected. E. g., Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 741. And the Agency's longstanding interpretation is not automatically deprived of the judicial deference otherwise its due because it was previously reached through means less formal than notice-and-comment rule-making. Chevron, supra, at 843. Pp. 217-222.
(b) Also consistent with the statute is the Agency's regulation providing that "[y]ou are not entitled to a trial work period" if "you perform work . . . within 12 months of the onset of the impairment . . . and before the date of any . . . decision finding . . . you . . . disabled," 20 CFR § 404.1592(d)(2) (emphasis added). The statute is ambiguous, and the regulation treats a pre-Agency-decision actual return to work as if it were determinative of the "can be expected to last" question. The statute's complexity, the vast number of claims it engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience lead the Court to read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in matters of detail related to its administration. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 43-44. The interpretation at issue is such a matter. Pp. 222-225.
235 F. 3d 184, reversed.
213
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