Cite as: 535 U. S. 391 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
214 F. 3d 1011, 1020 (CA8 2000) (assuming reassignment is not required if it would violate legitimate, nondiscriminatory policies); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F. 3d 1222, 1225 (CA11 1997) (policy of not reassigning salaried workers to production positions covered by a collective-bargaining unit); Daugherty v. El Paso, 56 F. 3d 695, 700 (CA5 1995) (policy of giving full-time employees priority over part-time employees in assigning vacant positions).
Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in at least some of its regulations, acknowledges that the ADA clears away only obstacles arising from a person's disability and nothing more. According to the agency, the term "reasonable accommodation" means
"(i) [m]odifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or
"(ii) [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment . . . that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or
"(iii) [m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities." 29 CFR § 1630.2(o) (2001) (emphasis added).
See also 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9, at 364 ("reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to . . . equal employment opportunity . . . are removed or alleviated").
Sadly, this analysis is lost on the Court, which mistakenly and inexplicably concludes, ante, at 398, that my position here is the same as that attributed to US Airways. In rejecting the argument that the ADA creates no "automatic exemption" for neutral workplace rules such as "break-
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