Cite as: 535 U. S. 467 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
ticular rate." 525 U. S., at 423 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). We accordingly reach the conclusion adopted by the Court of Appeals, that nothing in § 252(d)(1) plainly requires reference to historical investment when pegging rates to forward-looking "cost."
B
The incumbents' alternative argument is that even without a stern anchor in calculating "the cost . . . of providing the . . . network element," the particular forward-looking methodology the FCC chose is neither consistent with the plain language of § 252(d)(1) nor within the zone of reasonable interpretation subject to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-845 (1984). This is so, they say, because TELRIC calculates the forward-looking cost by reference to a hypothetical, most efficient element at existing wire centers, not the actual network element being provided.
1
The short answer to the objection that TELRIC violates plain language is much the same as the answer to the previous plain-language argument, for what the incumbents call the "hypothetical" element is simply the element valued in terms of a piece of equipment an incumbent may not own. This claim, like the one just considered, is that plain language bars a definition of "cost" untethered to historical investment, and as explained already, the term "cost" is simply too protean to support the incumbents' argument.
2
Similarly, the claim that TELRIC exceeds reasonable interpretative leeway is open to the objection already noted, that responsibility for "just and reasonable" rates leaves methodology largely subject to discretion. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 790 (1968) ("We must re-
501
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