Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 11 (2002)

Page:   Index   Previous  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  Next

574

ASHCROFT v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Opinion of the Court

Obscene speech, for example, has long been held to fall outside the purview of the First Amendment. See, e. g., Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484-485 (1957). But this Court struggled in the past to define obscenity in a manner that did not impose an impermissible burden on protected speech. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the "intractable obscenity problem"); see also Miller v. California, 413 U. S., at 20-23 (re-viewing "the somewhat tortured history of th[is] Court's obscenity decisions"). The difficulty resulted from the belief that "in the area of freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression." Id., at 22-23.

Ending over a decade of turmoil, this Court in Miller set forth the governing three-part test for assessing whether material is obscene and thus unprotected by the First Amendment: "(a) [W]hether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id., at 24 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

Miller adopted the use of "community standards" from Roth, which repudiated an earlier approach for assessing objectionable material. Beginning in the 19th century, English courts and some American courts allowed material to be evaluated from the perspective of particularly sensitive persons. See, e. g., Queen v. Hicklin [1868] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360; see also Roth, 354 U. S., at 488-489, and n. 25 (listing relevant cases). But in Roth, this Court held that this sensitive person standard was "unconstitutionally restrictive of

Page:   Index   Previous  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007