608
Stevens, J., dissenting
whether descriptions of sexual acts or depictions of nudity are patently offensive with respect to minors. Nor does the requirement that the material be "in some sense erotic," see ante, at 579 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 213, and n. 10 (1975)), substantially narrow the category of images covered. Arguably every depiction of nudity—partial or full—is in some sense erotic with respect to minors.4
Petitioner's argument that the "serious value" prong minimizes the statute's overbreadth is also unpersuasive. Although we have recognized that the serious value determination in obscenity cases should be based on an objective, reasonable person standard, Pope v. Illinois, 481 U. S. 497, 500 (1987), this criterion is inadequate to cure COPA's over-breadth because COPA adds an important qualifying phrase to the standard Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), formulation of the serious value prong. The question for the jury is not whether a reasonable person would conclude that the materials have serious value; instead, the jury must determine whether the materials have serious value for minors. Congress reasonably concluded that a substantial number of works, which have serious value for adults, do not have serious value for minors. Cf. ACLU I, 521 U. S., at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("While discussions about prison rape or nude art . . . may have some redeeming educational value for adults, they do not necessarily have any such value for minors"). Thus, even though the serious value prong limits the total amount of speech covered by the statute, it remains true that there is a significant amount of protected speech within the category of materials that have no serious value for minors. That speech is effectively prohibited whenever
4 Of course, Justice Thomas' example of the image "of a war victim's wounded nude body," ante, at 579, n. 9, would not be covered by the statute unless it depicted "a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast" and lacked serious political value for minors, 47 U. S. C. §§ 231(e)(6)(B)-(C) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
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