Cite as: 535 U. S. 685 (2002)
Syllabus
court's adjudication was contrary to this Court's clearly established law. Pp. 693-698.
(b) Nor was the state court's decision "an unreasonable application" of Strickland. Strickland requires a defendant to overcome the "presumption that . . . the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' " 466 U. S., at 689. Section 2254(d)(1) requires respondent to do more, i. e., show that the state court applied Strickland to his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. This he cannot do. Counsel was faced with the onerous task of defending a client who had committed a brutal and senseless crime and who, despite a relatively normal upbringing, had become a drug addict and robber. Counsel reasonably could have concluded that the substance of the medical experts' testimony during the guilt phase was still fresh to the jury during the sentencing phase, and that respondent's mother had not made a good witness at the guilt stage and should not be subjected to further cross-examination. Respondent's sister refused to testify, and counsel had sound tactical reasons for not calling respondent himself. Counsel also feared that the prosecution might elicit information about respondent's criminal history from other witnesses that he could have called, and that testimony about respondent's normal youth might cut the other way in the jury's eyes. Counsel's final-argument options were to make a closing argument and reprise for the jury the primary mitigating evidence, plead for his client's life, and impress upon the jury other, less significant facts, knowing that it would give the persuasive lead prosecutor the chance to depict his client as a heartless killer just before the jurors began deliberation; or to prevent the lead prosecutor from arguing by waiving his own summation and relying on the jurors' familiarity with the case and his opening plea for life made just a few hours before. Neither option so clearly outweighs the other that it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to deem his choice a tactical decision about which competent lawyers might disagree. Pp. 698-702.
243 F. 3d 961, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 702.
Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General of Tennessee, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General, and Jennifer L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.
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