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Opinion of the Court
ests in the contested provision. Employers wanted fewer weeks; employees wanted more. See H. R. Rep. No. 102- 135, pt. 1, p. 37 (1991). Congress resolved the conflict by choosing a middle ground, a period considered long enough to serve "the needs of families" but not so long that it would upset "the legitimate interests of employers." § 2601(b).
Courts and agencies must respect and give effect to these sorts of compromises. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 818-819 (1980). The Secretary's chosen penalty subverts the careful balance, for it gives certain employees a right to more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in a given 1-year period. This is so in part because the employee will often enjoy every right guaranteed by the FMLA during part or all of an undesignated absence. Under the Secretary's regulations, moreover, employers must comply with the FMLA's minimum requirements during these un-designated periods. See, e. g., 29 CFR § 825.208(c) (2001) (an employee on paid leave "is subject to the full protections of the Act" during "the absence preceding the notice to the employee of the [FMLA] designation"). Here, the Secretary required Wolverine to maintain Ragsdale's health benefits for at least 12 weeks of her 30-week absence; if it had not, Ragsdale could have sued. The penalty provision, in turn, required the company to grant Ragsdale 12 more weeks after the 30 weeks had passed. Section 2654 merely authorizes the Secretary to issue rules "necessary to carry out" the Act, but these regulations extended Wolverine's liability far beyond the 12-week total guaranteed by the statute. It is no answer to say, as the Government does, that the Secretary's provision is consistent with the Act because employers must provide more than 12 weeks of leave only when they do not comply with the individualized notice requirement. If this argument carried the day, a penalty of 24 weeks— or 36, or 48—would also be permissible. Just as those provisions would be contrary to the FMLA's 12-week mandate, so is § 825.700(a).
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