296
Stevens, J., dissenting
Buckley), the individual focus of § 1232g(b) is manifest. Moreover, simply because a "pattern or practice" is a precondition to individual relief does not mean that the right asserted is not an individually enforceable right. Cf. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 690- 695 (1978) (authorizing municipal liability under § 1983 when a municipality's "policy or custom" has caused the violation of an individual's federal rights).
Although § 1232g(b) alone provides strong evidence that an individual federal right has been created, this conclusion is bolstered by viewing the provision in the overall context of FERPA. Not once in its opinion does the Court acknowledge the substantial number of references to "rights" in the FERPA provisions surrounding § 1232g(b), even though our past § 1983 cases have made clear that a given statutory provision's meaning is to be discerned "in light of the entire legislative enactment," Suter v. Artist M., 503 U. S. 347, 357 (1992).4 Rather, ignoring these provisions, the Court asserts that FERPA—not just § 1232g(b)—"entirely lack[s]" rights-creating language, ante, at 287. The Court also claims that "we have never before held . . . that spending legislation drafted in terms resembling those of FERPA can confer enforceable rights." Ante, at 279. In making this claim, the Court contrasts FERPA's "[n]o funds shall be made available" language with "individually focused termi-4 The Court correctly states that "rights" language alone does not necessarily create rights enforceable under § 1983, ante, at 289, n. 7 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)), but such language is certainly relevant to whether a statute creates rights, see ante, at 287 (describing " 'rights-creating' language" as "critical to showing the requisite congressional intent to create new rights"). Moreover, in Pennhurst, the Court treated the "rights" language as the only arguable evidence that the statute created rights; here, the " 'overall' or 'specific' purposes of the Act," 451 U. S., at 18, also show an intent to create individual rights. See supra, at 295 and this page (discussing FERPA's "stated purpose").
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