McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 44 (2002)

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Cite as: 536 U. S. 24 (2002)

Stevens, J., dissenting

in the program. Ante, at 38. Of course, the Department could still house participants together without moving those who refuse to participate to more restrictive conditions of confinement and taking away their privileges. Moreover, petitioners have not alleged that respondent is taking up a bed in a unit devoted to the SATP; therefore, all the Department would have to do is allow respondent to stay in his current medium-security cell. If need be, the Department could always transfer respondent to another medium-security unit. Given the absence of evidence in the record that the Department has a shortage of medium-security beds, or even that there is a separate unit devoted to participants in the SATP, the only plausible explanation for the transfer to maximum security and loss of Level III status is that it serves as punishment for refusing to participate in the program.

Justice O'Connor recognizes that the transfer is a penalty, but finds insufficient coercion because the "changes in [respondent's] living conditions seem to [her] minor." Ante, at 51 (opinion concurring in judgment). The coerciveness of the penalty in this case must be measured not by comparing the quality of life in a prison environment with that in a free society, but rather by the contrast between the favored and disfavored classes of prisoners. It is obviously impossible to measure precisely the significance of the difference between being housed in a four-person, maximum-security cell in the most dangerous area of the prison, on the one hand, and having a key to one's own room, the right to take a shower, and the ability to move freely within adjacent areas during certain hours, on the other—or to fully appreciate the importance of visitation privileges, being able to send more than $30 per pay period to family, having access to the yard for exercise, and the opportunity to participate in group activities. What is perfectly clear, however, is that it is the aggregate effect of those penalties that creates compulsion. Nor is it coincidental that petitioners have selected this same

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