Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 15 (2002)

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Cite as: 536 U. S. 73 (2002)

Opinion of the Court

Finally, our conclusions that some regulation is permissible and this one is reasonable are not open to Echazabal's objection that they reduce the direct threat provision to "surplusage," see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 698 (1995). The mere fact that a threat-to-self defense reasonably falls within the general "job related" and "business necessity" standard does not mean that Congress accomplished nothing with its explicit provision for a defense based on threats to others. The provision made a conclusion clear that might otherwise have been fought over in litigation or administrative rule-making. It did not lack a job to do merely because the EEOC might have adopted the same rule later in applying the general defense provisions, nor was its job any less responsible simply because the agency was left with the option to go a step further. A provision can be useful even without congressional attention being indispensable.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

contractors to have steelworkers without vertigo as to have well-balanced ones. See 226 F. 3d, at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting). Reasonableness does not turn on formalism. We have no occasion, however, to try to describe how acutely an employee must exhibit a disqualifying condition before an employer may exclude him from the class of the generally qualified. See Brief for Respondent 31. This is a job for the trial courts in the first instance.


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