Cite as: 537 U. S. 101 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact." Scott, supra, at 96. Instead, we see here a State which, for any number of perfectly understandable reasons, supra, at 110, has quite reasonably agreed to accept the default penalty of life imprisonment when the conviction is affirmed and the case is, except for that issue, at an end—but to pursue its not-yet-vindicated interest in " 'one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws' " where the case must be retried anyway, post, at 124 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497, 509 (1978)).
V
In addition to his double-jeopardy claim, petitioner raises a freestanding claim alleging deprivation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He contends that, regardless of whether the imposition of the death sentence at the second trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, it unfairly deprived him of his "life" and "liberty" interests in the life sentence resulting from his first sentencing proceeding. He frames the argument in these terms:
"Pennsylvania created a constitutionally protected life and liberty interest in the finality of the life judgment statutorily mandated as a result of a [deadlocked] jury. That right vested when the court found the jury deadlocked and imposed a mandatory life sentence. Subjecting [p]etitioner to a capital resentencing once that right has vested violated [D]ue [P]rocess." Reply Brief for Petitioner 18-19.
We think not. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Nothing indicates that any "life" or "liberty" interest that Pennsylvania law may have given peti-
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