Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 21 (2003)

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Cite as: 537 U. S. 101 (2003)

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

that justice is meted out to offenders." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Weighing these interests, we have decided that mistrials declared on the motion of the prosecution or sua sponte by the court terminate jeopardy unless stopping the proceedings is required by "manifest necessity." Id., at 93-94; see, e. g., Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734, 737-738 (1963). A hung jury, the Court has long recognized, meets the "manifest necessity" criterion, i. e., it justifies a trial court's declaration of a mistrial and the defendant's subsequent reprosecution. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497, 509 (1978). Retrial is also permissible where "a defendant successfully seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for mistrial," Scott, 437 U. S., at 93, unless the motion is intentionally provoked by the government's actions, id., at 94. Ordinarily, "[s]uch a motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact." Id., at 93.

The second category described in Scott—"termination of [a] trial in [a defendant's] favor before any determination of factual guilt or innocence," id., at 94—is distinguished from the first based on the quality of finality a termination order imports. "When a trial court declares a mistrial, it all but invariably contemplates that the prosecutor will be permitted to proceed anew notwithstanding the defendant's plea of double jeopardy." Id., at 92. When a motion to terminate is granted, in contrast, the trial court "obviously contemplates that the proceedings will terminate then and there in favor of the defendant." Id., at 94. In Scott, for example, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss one count of the indictment, prior to its submission to the jury, on the ground of preindictment delay. If the prosecution had wanted to "reinstate the proceedings in the face of such a ruling," it could not simply have refiled the indictment; in-

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