274
Opinion of the Court
banc "at the earliest opportunity." 258 F. 3d 1069, 1079, n. 2 (2001) (opinion of Gould, J.).
The Government sought certiorari. It noted that the Ninth Circuit's holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated in Cruz. And it asked us to decide the rule's validity, i. e., to decide whether "a conspiracy ends as a matter of law when the government frustrates its objective." Pet. for Cert. (I). We agreed to consider that question.
II
In Cruz, the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues " 'until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy.' " 127 F. 3d, at 795 (quoting Castro, supra, at 1112). The critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has been " 'defeat of [its] object.' " The Circuit's holdings make clear that the phrase means that the conspiracy ends through "defeat" when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracy's goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has "defeat[ed]" the conspiracy's "object."
Two basic considerations convince us that this is the proper view of the law. First, the Ninth Circuit's rule is inconsistent with our own understanding of basic conspiracy law. The Court has repeatedly said that the essence of a conspiracy is "an agreement to commit an unlawful act." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975); see United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 16 (1994); Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942). That agreement is "a distinct evil," which "may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues." Salinas v. United
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