United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 7 (2003)

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276

UNITED STATES v. JIMENEZ RECIO

Opinion of the Court

acy decisions, has concluded that "[i]mpossibility of success is not a defense." 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.5, at 85; see also id., § 6.5(b), at 90-93. And the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 5.03, p. 384 (1985), would find that a conspiracy "terminates when the crime or crimes that are its object are committed" or when the relevant "agreement . . . is abandoned." It would not find "impossibility" a basis for termination.

The Cruz majority argued that the more traditional termination rule threatened "endless" potential liability. To illustrate the point, the majority posited a sting in which police instructed an arrested conspirator to go through the "telephone directory . . . [and] call all of his acquaintances" to come and help him, with the Government obtaining convictions of those who did so. 127 F. 3d, at 795, n. 3. The problem with this example, however, is that, even though it is not necessarily an example of entrapment itself, it draws its persuasive force from the fact that it bears certain resemblances to entrapment. The law independently forbids convictions that rest upon entrapment. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U. S. 540, 548-549 (1992); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 442-445 (1932). And the example fails to explain why a different branch of the law, conspiracy law, should be modified to forbid entrapment-like behavior that falls outside the bounds of current entrapment law. Cf. United States v. Russell, 411 U. S. 423, 435 (1973) ("defense of entrapment . . . not intended to give the federal judiciary . . . veto" over disapproved "law enforcement practices"). At the same time, the Cruz rule would reach well beyond arguable police misbehavior, potentially threatening the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 208-209 (1966) (Government may "use decoys" and conceal agents' identity); see also M. Lyman, Criminal Investigation 484-485 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the importance of undercover operations in enforcing drug laws).

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