Cite as: 537 U. S. 280 (2003)
Syllabus
rejected. For one thing, Congress said nothing in the Act or in the legislative history about extending vicarious liability in this manner. And such silence, while permitting an inference that Congress intended to apply ordinary background tort principles, cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modification of those rules. This Court has applied unusually strict rules only where Congress has specified that such was its intent. See, e. g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 280-281. For another thing, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the agency primarily charged with the Act's implementation and administration, has specified that ordinary vicarious liability rules apply in this area, and the Court ordinarily defers to an administering agency's reasonable statutory interpretation, e. g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. Finally, no convincing argument supports the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply nontraditional vicarious liability principles. It erred in relying on language in a then-applicable HUD regulation, which, taken as a whole, says that ordinary, not unusual, liability rules apply. And the holdings in cases from other Circuits that the Ninth Circuit cited do not support the kind of nontraditional liability that it applied, nor does the language of those cases provide a convincing rationale for the Ninth Circuit's conclusions. Pp. 285-289.
(b) Nothing in the Act's language or legislative history supports the existence of a corporate owner's or officer's "nondelegable duty" not to discriminate. Such a duty imposed on a principal would "go further" than the vicarious liability principles discussed thus far to create liability although the principal has done everything that could reasonably be required of him, and irrespective of whether the agent was acting with or without authority. In the absence of legal support, the Court cannot conclude that Congress intended, through silence, to impose a special duty of protection upon individual officers or owners of corporations— who are not principals (or contracting parties) in respect to the corporation's unlawfully acting employee. Neither does it help to characterize the Act's objective as an overriding societal priority. The complex question of which one of two innocent people must suffer, and when, should be answered in accordance with traditional principles of vicarious liability—unless Congress has instructed the courts differently. Pp. 289-291.
(c) The Court does not address respondents' remaining contentions because they were not considered by the Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit remains free on remand to consider any such arguments that were properly raised. Pp. 291-292.
258 F. 3d 1127, vacated and remanded.
281
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